公平关切下参照价格效应的绿色供应链定价策略

以制造商主导的由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的绿色供应链为研究对象,基于消费者的参照价格构造了制造商公平关切、零售商公平关切和供应链成员均公平关切三种供应链模型,给出各模型下的最优定价策略,并分析了公平关切系数与消费者的参照价格效应对最优策略的影响。研究结果表明:公平关切系数与消费者的参照价格效应改变了产品的批发价格、绿色度水平和零售价格,且对供应链各成员以及整个供应链系统都产生了影响。     

Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption

The aim of this article is to give at least a partial answer to the question made in the title. Several works analyze the evolution of the corruption in different societies. Most of such papers show the necessity of several controls displayed by a central authority to deter the expansion of the corruption. However there is not much literature that addresses the issue of who controls the controller. This article aims to approach an answer to this question. Indeed, as it is well known, in democratic societies an important role should be played by citizens. We show that politically active citizens can prevent the spread of corruption. More precisely, we introduce a game between government and officials where both can choose between a corrupt or honest behavior. Citizens have a political influence that results in the prospects of a corrupt and a non-corrupt government be re-elected or not. This results in an index of intolerance to corruption. We build an evolutionary version of the game by means of the replicator dynamics and we analyze and fully characterize the possible trajectories of the system according to the index of intolerance to corruption and other relevant quantities of the model.     

The Game Saturation Number of a Graph

Given a family and a host graph H, a graph is ‐saturated relative to H if no subgraph of G lies in but adding any edge from to G creates such a subgraph. In the ‐saturation game on H, players Max and Min alternately add edges of H to G, avoiding subgraphs in , until G becomes ‐saturated relative to H. They aim to maximize or minimize the length of the game, respectively; denotes the length under optimal play (when Max starts). Let denote the family of odd cycles and the family of n‐vertex trees, and write F for when . Our results include , for , for , and for . We also determine ; with , it is n when n is even, m when n is odd and m is even, and when is odd. Finally, we prove the lower bound . The results are very similar when Min plays first, except for the P₄‐saturation game on .     

基于分形博弈的动量和反转效应转换研究

动量和反转效应普遍存在于证券市场,且会相互转换,但两者间相互转换的特征却鲜有人知.在多数派和少数派博弈的基础上,首次引入分形市场理论对投资者决策特征进行描述,据此建立了分形博弈过程,以分析动量和反转效应转换的统计特征.研究结果表明:在三种博弈机制下,分形博弈机制下的仿真收益率序列的统计分形特征更为接近实际序列的对数收益率序列,且动量和反转效应的相互转换与真实情况也异常相似,这体现了采用分形博弈分析动量和反转效应转换的有效性,为投资者构建有效的动量或反转投资策略提供了决策参考.     

Educational effects in an experiment with the management game SINTO-Market

This paper examines how the educational background influences the performance of managers’ strategies. The research is based on data collected by an experiment with the management game SINTO-Market. This management game puts the players in a competitive situation in the branded food product sector, within which the subjects take over the role of the managers who have to find out the most successful strategy. From experimental research with this management game we will draw some interesting conclusions about human behavior in complex economic decision-making situations. To investigate educational effects the management game SINTO-Market was performed with students of different educational levels 17 times. The results show some significant differences between graduates and undergraduates.     

Bimatrix games have quasi-strict equilibria

Received April 21, 1995 / Revised version received June 12, 1998 Published online November 24, 1998     

Quantum Game with Restricted Matrix Strategies

We study a quantum game played by two players with restricted multiple strategies. It is found that in this restricted quantum game Nash equilibrium does not always exist when the initial state is entangled. At the same time,we find that when Nash equilibrium exists the payoff function is usually different from that in the classical counterpart except in some special cases. This presents an explicit example showing quantum game and classical game may differ.When designing a quantum game with limited strategies, the allowed strategy should be carefully chosen according to the type of initial state.     

On existence of complete sets for bounded reducibilities

Classical reducibilities have complete sets U that any recursively enumerable set can be reduced to U. This paper investigates existence of complete sets for reducibilities with limited oracle access. Three characteristics of classical complete sets are selected and a natural hierarchy of the bounds on oracle access is built. As the bounds become stricter, complete sets lose certain characteristics and eventually vanish. (© 2003 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)     

Type monotonic allocation schemes for a class of market games

We consider an extension of glove markets, called T-markets, characterize a family of weighted allocation rules, and define related cooperative games. For the class of T-market games we introduce a new solution concept called the type monotonic allocation scheme. It turns out that the nucleolus and the τ-value generate the same type monotonic allocation scheme with nice extra properties. Initial research for this paper was supported by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund grant OTKA T030945. The authors thank Ruud Hendrickx for his valuable comments. Research of T. Solymosi was also supported in part by OTKA grant T046194.     

需求不确定的供应链两阶段订货模型

销售商如何在不确定需求的市场环境下根据制造商提供的订货条件进行合理订货是供应链管理的一个核心问题。本文利用信号博弈的原理从销售商的角度研究在不确定需求且传统需求预测方法失效的情况下，允许调整订货量的短生命周期产品两阶段订货模型，得到了在两次订货条件下销售商应该采取的最优订货量与调整策略以及制造商对契约灵活性限制的成本函数。